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Introduction
Drastic changes of the past few decades showed
that there were still a lot of economic “things-in-
themselves” that could not be comprehended, at least
from the point of view of existing neoclassic paradigm.
For a certain period of time economic, social, political
and mental altering of several well-known nations in the
end of the 20th century was of great interest to traditional
institutional approach. However, recent global economic
downturn, which once again proved ineffectiveness of
existing institutions, has summoned a new training ground
for felicitous institutional analysis.
It is obvious that existing model of economic and
financial performance has too many flaws. Subjective
ratings, structured instruments of investment, narrow-
mindedness of stock analysts obscure real value of assets.
More importantly, the possibility of continuous
refinancing of existing public and commercial debts
aggravates current situation. There is no point in looking
for a remedy from a disease if it can be palliated by
existing financial ointments while its exasperation is
anticipated in distant future.
The analogy with symptoms and reasons of a disease
is quite prevalent today. Yet, it means a lot to an institutional
approach. Imagine that existing institutions are already
affected by a surreptitious disease while the majority of
“professionals” deem them healthy. It creates a pantomime
of an effective functioning of a system. A few eventually
give credit to the dimensioned internal lock-in effect of
modern financial order when money, as a pivoting element
of any economic system, has lost their initial functions
and have virtually turned into “a credit for unissued credits”.
In a system, which is based on “errant’ cash flows,
warped calculations and behavioral uncertainty, an
economic crisis is inevitable. Every full-scale downturn
of a system can be considered to be a deinstitutionalizing
crunch, which saliently shows ineffectiveness of
functioning institutions and animates an idea of global
shifts in an existing system. In this paper we show that
evolution can hardly be maintained by human actions.
The neutral nature of markets forces institutions to be
selected comparatively inefficiently, due to known lock-
in effects on technologies effective from the stand of
market process efficacy. The latter will prevail even if
institutions and technologies are not result-effective but
conduce to the expansion of exchanges, thus granting
stable motion to a neutral market mechanism.
Efficiency and neutrality
In economic literature the category “market” is being
more often used in the context of “an efficient competitive
market” or “inefficient monopolistic market”. We also come
across contentious oppositions of market mechanism to
alternative ways of coordination like “the society has to
make a choice between market efficiency and social
justice”. Such an interpretation of one of the most
important economic categories “market” often fails to
establish its true nature and, on the contrary, takes us away
from reasons to the results of any market performance.
A market process is connected with two important
definitions — exchanges and competition. However, in
some models (especially neoclassic ones) the last
category, with the market itself, is virtually brought to
abstractions, having nothing in common with real
economic issues. Moreover, a great number of neoclassic
models doesn’t require explanation of a market process
and (or) competition which makes them applicable to
the description of any type of an economy.
Finally, we deem that the idea of economic efficiency,
which is predominant in neoclassic orthodoxy — Pareto-
efficiency, has a remote relation to market process, being,
in its core, the efficiency of the result, but not the process.
We comprehend a market as a neutral, spontaneous
mechanism of exchange, coordination and selection.
Positive or negative results of market performance depend
on contemporaneous institutions prevailing in the society.
This statement is consistent with Hodgson’s idea that the
influence of institutions and routines on preferences and
behavior of people is likely to be positive or negative. There
isn’t any vicious circle here: the results are not obliged to
bear any definite characteristics. Our point is that the
impact, made by institutionalized demeanor on preferences
and activities of people cannot be deemed neutral (Hodgson,
1988). On the other hand, markets, as an instrument of
resources’ allocation, are a neutral mechanism that can
lead to expansion of exchanges or their folding. The
direction of any system’s development, based on market
exchanges and, consequently, derived from the functioning
of markets, is defined exactly by non-neutral institutions.
The exchange as in increment of values
The concept of an efficient result does not
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emphasize its attention on exchanges. The exchanges
within this paradigm lead to augment of values, but only
to a certain extent. Oppositely, in the research of market
process efficacy, exchanges claim for a pivoting role;
they are also considered to be productive.
Next, while analyzing the productivity of exchanges,
a “value” category is used. Let us concisely depict what
is assumed under this category in the paper. We accept
fundamental principles of Austrian value theory,
formulated by C. Menger (1871). First, the definition of
a value, resulting in an action, means preference or refusal;
it never stands for equality and (or) indifference.
Secondly, there isn’t any other approach to compare
valuations of different individuals in sundry situations but
to determine whether the investigated alternatives are at
the same level of preference. Consequently, the definition
of a value is a subjective assessment, reflecting value
difference: the preference of an alternative A to alternative
B of exchanging goods (Mises, 1949).
Economic exchange happens only in cases when a
participant, performing the act of an exchange, receives
any augment of value to the value of existing set of goods.
This argument is proved by Menger (1871) from the
assumption that there are two parties. The first one has a
good A with the value  , the second one — a good B
with the value . As a result of their exchange the value
of goods in the possession of the first party will be:
 , the second party:  . From
this notion it can be inferred that the exchange process
increased the goods value of every participant by a certain
magnitude. This example shows that the activity
connected with exchanges is not a futile squandering of
time and resources, but a productive work just as the
manufacturing of material goods.
While investigating an exchange it is impossible not
to mention its limits. An exchange will continue until the
value of goods within the possession of every participant
(their subjective valuations) is less than the value of goods
obtainable as the result of an exchange. This thesis is
true for all exchange contractors. Using the symbols of
the example above, it can be said that an exchange happens
if for the first party of an exchange and  
for the second one; or if x>0 and y>0.
As a corollary the following equation can be written:
 (1)
where   is the assessment of value after an
exchange,  value assessment before an exchange,
  value increment; within all voluntary exchanges
 .
Equation (1) serves as a purely illustrative
interpretation of what was said before and describes a
single act of an exchange. The key indicator here is δ ,
characterizing value increment or its difference, and
consequently, the very possibility and reasonability of
an exchange.
Evolutionary imminence
To explain market’s efficacy from the vantage point
of not a result, but process it is necessary to make a few
remarks that are stacked in two theses.
The first thesis is based on stating the fact, that
symmetric (the term “symmetric” and “asymmetric” are
used in relation to disposable information of exchange
subjects) and free exchange of economic goods leads to
increment of values. In other words, the value of goods
before an exchange is less than it is after it.
Usually it is doubtless that a basic market product —
price — has informational nature, though its functions are
not limited by only informational signals (the discussion
about this issue was conducted within the Austrian
Economics). That is why results of a market performance
as a mechanism of coordination and selection depend on
initial conditions of informational distribution and also on
the criteria of its interpretation by economic subjects
involved in the process of exchanges.
An important remark is required here: a market
produces selection and forms signals, used by individuals
while organizing their economic activities in compliance
with initial conditions of informational distribution pointed
out above. Therefore, while analyzing market’s “efficacy”
it is necessary to consider exactly the mentioned factors.
As it has been noted, a market is a neutral and
spontaneous mechanism of coordination and selection.
Deriving from the premise that markets are neutral a rule
can be formulated: in the result of market selection
informational signals obtain the features that were given
by initial distribution of information, whereas initial
conditions depend on social institutional frameworks and
cognitive abilities of individuals. Such selection leads to
results impossible to forecast, but in the direction
determined by initial informational-institutional
frameworks. A minor remark is required here. Initial
institutional conditions are formed spontaneously, often
as a result of insignificant (from the vantage point of
contemporaries) or even absolutely random factors. The
introduction of neo-evolutional theories, connected with
path dependence seems useful here. As shown by the
most prominent representative of this direction of
research B. Arthur insignificant historical events cannot
be eliminated and averaged in the long run, because they
can predetermine the occurring of these or those
consequences (Arthur, 1989). These historical events are
the initial institutional restrictions, which in the result of
inertia of political, technological and institutional structures
(Mokyr, 1992) may, depending on different factors (which
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are going to be investigated below), lead a system to the
situation of expansion or folding of exchanges.
Thus, when analyzing a market, it is indispensible to
depict a vector of selection, which is given by initial
institutional conditions and distribution of information. The
fundamental difference of this approach to neoclassic one
is that we cannot change this vector or denote optimal initial
distribution of information. These processes are evolutionary.
That is why a pivoting role here belongs to learning and
performance of single economic subjects, acting
conformably to their endogenous values criteria.
Comprehension of mechanisms and causes of such dynamic
shifts is an essential condition of probable adjustment of
individual preferences and moreover — economic policy.
On the basis of argued questions a second thesis can be
formulated, explaining the essence of the market process.
According to the second thesis, asymmetric
exchange leads to an undefined result and, in particular,
it may provoke a decrease in aggregated value of goods.
In other words, the value after an exchange may be either
more or less than before it.
As asymmetric exchange leads to an undefined
result, one of the consequences of such an issue is the
closing of markets and stopping of exchanges (Akerlof,
1970). It isn’t lucrative for any of the engaged parties.
Therefore, all of them are interested (although
incommensurably) in decreasing information asymmetry.
As a corollary such situation generates incentives to
search for new ways of creating rules, and in the long
term — institutions, lowering information asymmetry.
Market process efficacy
Efficacy of a process is based on the following statement:
on the one hand every exchange leads to value increment, on
the other one — value increment eventually stimulates new
exchanges. Thus, we can characterize efficacy of a process,
in the first turn, as an ability to multiplicatively increase the
amount of exchanges and in the second turn — as an increase
of value being an aggregated indicator of value increment in
individual transactions.
We should note that a straight quantitative calculation
of gross value can only be conducted indirectly due to
non-additive nature of individual utilities. That is why,
when formulating a criteria of market process efficacy
we can talk only about comparative indicators of value
(what is virtually derived from its definition).
From what was stated above the equation (1) can
be modified in the following way:
  (2)
where k — informational compound, characterizing
the symmetry of exchanges. If there is asymmetry of
information, then  . Actually, k might be less than
zero in cases of opportunistic behavior, but we do not include
such exchanges in our analysis. Following this logic, in case
of positive externalities, coefficient k may exceed unity.
Coefficient k is a synthetic indicator. It depends on
learning opportunities (I), external effects of exchange
(positive or negative) (e), existing institutions, which
function is to decrease transaction costs (i); it is also
correlated with an indicator, depicting symmetry of
informational distribution among agents (s):
Thus, along with initial distribution of information
(that we generally don’t know, though neoclassic models
have it as “data”), institutions depict whether a system is
on its way to the expansion of exchanges of their folding.
If we cannot determine whether a given distribution
of resources is efficient ex ante, than what parameters may
and should be included in the model, explaining process
efficacy? Neither a concrete distribution of resources nor
its dynamics is important for the process efficacy. The primal
question here is the following: how do current conditions
influence future exchanges, do they contribute to their
expansion or not? The expansion of exchanges resembles a
chain reaction in physics. However, unlike the latter, where
time and spatial limits of a chain reaction are calculated and
known in advance, evolutionary expansion of economic
exchanges is indefinite in both dimensions.
The efficacy of a process is defined by a vector,
denoting the development of a competitive system, but
not the result of competitive collaboration and exchanges.
If a system moves toward the expansion of exchanges
we can treat it as an effective one; if not, when a relative
folding of exchanges occurs, an economic system
overlaps and decays.
The most important indicator describing the quality
of a current system’s state and the vector of its
development is the condition of institutional structure.
Formally, it can be defined relatively to k magnitude,
reflecting the symmetry of exchanges. Competition is
the key mechanism making it possible to realize the
potential of a market, without accounting for exact
proportions of sellers and buyers at the same moment of
time. Competition also conduces to selection of efficient
institutional constraints, generally comprising an
institutional structure of an economic order.
Equilibrium and market’s efficiency
The usage of the conception of market process
efficacy is, first of all, aimed at explaining the role
institutional restrictions take in functioning of an economic
order, which is based on competition, free exchanges
and entrepreneurial initiative. That is why all arguments
above can be applied only to economies that have market
exchanges within them or, at least, collaboration of
different centralized orders.
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Undoubtedly, the question about the concatenation
of process efficacy and equilibrium is of considerable
importance. As it can be inferred from the logic of
exchanges’ definition and process efficacy, the idea of
equilibrium is exuberant within this context. We can speak
about equilibrium only to characterize misbalance, i.e. in
our case this is a situation when valuations exceedingly
discord. It makes an exchange possible. It is hard to
argue that every exchange is to be completed as a state
of short or long term quiescence. But in a certain period
of time (that might range significantly) market agents
will have to be involved in exchanges once again, (as the
time bestows new incentives of this kind on them) which
were not explicit in the end of preceding exchanges. As a
static market stance, equilibrium is not effective from
the vantage point of process efficacy.
Pareto-efficient equilibrium within perfect
competition illustrates a situation when such a level of
prices is achieved that an infinite number of contracts
can be made according to initial distribution of resources.
But a consecutive question arises: if every act of an
exchange assumes value increment, or otherwise the
exchange is pointless, than how, within perfect
competition in a balanced system, accumulated volume
of values and information is systemized? It is impossible
to answer this question without referring to different
“objective indicators” in the form of initially available
resources, which are basically reproduced in a static
balanced system. But in this case there is no place for
subjective valuations, which are vital for existence of
exchanges, markets and competition. Therefore, all cases
of equilibrium don’t need such “trinkets” as markets or
competition and as a corollary — they cannot be used in
the concept of market process efficacy.
The market process efficacy concept allows to
explain market mechanism as a neutral one. As pointed
out above, markets have neutral nature and, as a process
of exchange, they do not guarantee efficiency of neither
a process nor a result. Besides, being an exchange
mechanism, markets also implement a selection function.
Therefore, a market process should be analyzed from
the arguments of evolutionary theory.
For a long time within the predominant neoclassic
paradigm economic systems were treated via the prism
of static institutional structures. It summoned practical
absence of qualitative institutional changes. And though
there are certain theories of dynamic shifts within
Marxism, mainstream economics does not have such a
theory; in case of its development, it should be based
on the model of institutional changes (North, 1990).
Despite the fact that significant results concerning
modification of statements of the “protective cord”
(Lakatos, 1978) and even the “hard core” of neoclassic
paradigm were achieved, theory of institutional changes
is still on the periphery of contemporary institutional
economic research. As a result of transformation of
transitive economies specific institutional structures
appear. They hinder application of advantages of
extended market order as one of the most efficient ways
of economic coordination. Markets, which forming was
treated as a panacea for post socialistic countries, have
often showed their inconsistency within radical
economic reforms. The reason for that is not in “market
failures” or even “public failures”. Reasons of
inefficiency of a market mechanism are concealed in
oversimplified comprehension of the market process
and prices as a primary outcome of its performance.
If competition forms market prices than a long term
guideline depicting the very order of economic
organization also competes with alternative demeanor
models. If an institutional structure is in the stage of
forming or shifting than the institutions constructing it
will appear and lock in depending on comparative
efficiency of alternative ways, allowing coordination of
economic activity (Volchik, 1997).
Market appeared long ago. Ancient societies used
markets for both local and intergovernmental exchanges.
As a way of coordination, for a long time markets were
not connected with nations’ welfare growth or involved
in conformable relations. Only the formation of
appropriate institutional structures allowed spontaneous
mechanism of market exchange to transform into an
“invisible hand”, guiding societies to prosperity.
Inefficiency of some and efficiency of other
mechanisms of coordination is revealed as a result of
institutional metacompetition. In economic literature
metacompetition is the competition of institutions: “if there
is any form of economic organization, than it is effective,
because only the most powerful survives in the process
of competitive struggle, i.e. the most effective institutions”
(Kapelushnikov, 1990)
Deteriorating selection of institutions with a
decreasing marginal return, leading to the paradox of
markets’ inefficiency, which can also be contemplated
in presence of public enforcement and power groups, is
also summoned by actions of spontaneous evolutionary
processes (Volchik and Berezhnoy, 2008).
To explain the reasons of stability of paradox of
inefficient markets we bring forward the following
hypothesis: the functioning of mechanisms of
deteriorating selection of institutions within transformation
of economic orders leads to asymmetry of informational
torrents and emergence of selective incentives in groups,
interested in locking in of institutions with deteriorating
marginal return. These processes allow groups with
selective incentives to receive institutional rent and to
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adopt policy aimed at conserving existing suboptimal
institutional structures.
Thus, if we analyze the case of “inefficiency
paradox” from the point of view of proposed process
efficacy concept, a number of important notes can be
made. First, the exchanges with ineffective institutional
restrictions, i.e. when  in the equation (2), may be
Pareto-effective, but in the same time lead to folding of
open markets. Secondly, the stability of such economic
order can be attained via non-economic enforcement to
exchange. Thirdly, when non-economic enforcement is
absent or weakens, a system will strive for the stance
where market exchanges fold; therefore it will be
inefficient under the process efficacy concept.
One of the illustrations of inefficient market
paradoxes, though reversely, is the “QWERTY economy”
effect (David, 1985). The gist of this example is that market
selection might also conduce to adoption of ineffective
technologies (there are more economical keyboard layouts,
like the Dvorak keyboard) from the Pareto-efficiency stand.
Mokyr (1990) explains such a situation by the fact that
introduction of “QWERTY” technology was conjugated
with immense positive external effects. Using the language
of this paper it can be said that k magnitude exceeded one,
what led to expansion of exchanges, connected with the
technology. Consequently such technology is effective from
the stand of process efficacy that is determined by existing
institutional structure.
Historical evidence of bottle-neck and founder’s
effects
The observed case of economic exchanges under
the neutral markets concept shows that depending on
institutional conditions a system may move either toward
expansion or folding of exchanges. This process is
characterized not as much by static stance of institutional
structure, which is denoted by k coefficient, but by
dynamic process of institutional transformation.
It is important to understand that institutional
transformation is not bound to establish effective
institutional structures; it can also lead to substitution of
effective institutions by suboptimal ones. This thesis is
saliently seen throughout the economic history.
One of the vivid examples is the downturn of
Chinese and Japanese economies in 15-16th centuries. It
becomes even more evident if we observe ascension and
descent of rates depicting introduction of technological
innovations in Chinese manufacturing and trade. In the
beginning of the 15th century China was the most
technologically developed civilization in the world (Mokyr,
1990). Key inventions had originated in China hundreds
of years before they appeared in Europe as in the case
with blast furnaces that enabled China to master
metallurgy 200 years B.C. (Dosi, 1997).
The decay of China’s economy commenced from
the policy of deliberate isolation, in other words —
imposing ineffective institutional restrictions. It was also
considerably reflected on the level of used technologies.
Mokir (1990) assumed that the crucial factor of
technological conservatism in China was the fear of rulers
before potentially devastating influence that technological
changes might have on social stability. In China, as in
many other societies, numerous powers, especially
concentrated within town guilds, hindered the
dissemination of technologies. Bureaucrats, satisfied by
existing status-quo, were afraid of emerging social
conflicts (Dosi, 1988). The example of technological and
economic stagnation of China can easily be explained
from the position of market process efficacy. In this case,
ineffective institutional restrictions created multiplicative
effect, which folded exchanges.
We cannot always bestow right definition on institutions
relatively to whether they impede exchanges in certain
historical events or not. Medieval guild can serve as an
example of such an institution. Guilds didn’t always
contribute to growth of distributional coalitions and decrease
of competition and efficiency. On certain stages of economic
development guilds were the only way of institutional
adaptation. The historical argument brought forward by Greif
(1992) evidences that in time of Commercial revolutions an
institution like merchant guilds sustained the expansion of
trade. A merchant guild was a stipulation of trade’s expansion;
its genesis wasn’t provoked by new profits in trading.
Moreover, the time when guilds emerged and as a corollary
— the expansion of trading — was depicted by social and
political factors (Greif, 1992).
The culture and system of traditional institutions
resident in a society is often used to explain (un)successful
economic development. However, such explanation cannot
be always accepted as a sufficient proviso for development
of theories dealing with qualitative dynamics of social
systems. Many explanations of Japanese economic growth
account primarily for specific features of Japanese culture.
Despite that fact for a long time these specific features of
Japanese culture and mentality didn’t allow Japanese
economy to attain any significant results, conserving
archaic production and outrageous poverty (Olson, 1984).
The path dependence concept also explains why in
several societies, with repeating persistence, elites (political
in the first turn) chose worst variants from alternatives
of economic policy. Historical examples of such cases
can be found in works of many contemporary economic
historians, in particular, Nobel Prize winner — D. North
(1994), who analyzed the cases of choice of ineffective
policy during four centuries in Spain.
The process of institutional transformation is
undoubtedly evolutionary and historically stipulated. In
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an economy the role of genes belongs to institutions. It
is consistent with traditional evolutionary approach in
economic theory, though sometimes institutions are
superseded by routines. Routines are all normal and
predictable samples of firms’ behavior (Nelson and Winter,
1985). If we allow for an extended interpretation of
“firms’ behavior samples” as rules, structuring repeating
relationships than the finding about genes and routines
can also be projected on institutions.
If we deem economic evolution as a process of
growth of diversity, complexity and productivity of an
economy, triggered by periodic shifts in technologies,
products, organizations and institutions (Maevskiy, 2001),
than the model of “bottle neck effect” may give relevant
explanation of process of institutional transformation.
The importance of sequel of historical events can
be construed via the introduction of such models as “bottle
neck effect” and “founder’s effect”. In biology both
patterns are used as a particular case of a general problem
of “genes drifting”. If we put an analogy between biology
and processes of economic and social lives than this
biological event can be presented in form of large-scale
institutional changes. According to the “bottle neck
effect” (i.e. miniscule populations), it is likely that new
species appear when mutation is bound in generations.
Small populations are more plausible candidates for
microevolution and speciation than large ones, because
mutation seldom binds in large populations. In other
words, if species has many individuals; its prosperity
and propagation requires much more time for it to “evolve”
(millions of generations) unlike species which dwindling
population is in plight (Ayala and Kiger, 1984). The features
peculiar to small populations (in the moment of passing
through the bottle neck) will most likely be multiplied in
consecutive evolving of the population (fig. 1). Thus,
appearing numerous populations reproduce genetic
structure of their founders. American zoologist Mayr,
one of the initiators of synthetic evolutionary theory, called
this phenomenon “The founder’s effect” (Mayr, 1988).
The moment of drastic transformation of any economic
order leads to a so called transformational crisis (Polterovich,
2000). During this time there is an abrupt plummeting of
exchanges and deinstitutionalization takes place. The moment
of transition from one economic order to another one is
analogous to the “bottle neck effect” in biology, and therefore
can be named the same while describing economic
processes. Institutions, which are left from old economic
orders and are used to establish new ones, i.e. existing in
the initial moment of development of a new economic system,
gain special meaning for further evolution of this system.
Here the “founder’s effect” takes place.
Evidently, it is practically impossible to change the
vector of development of the economic system that has
just run through the “bottle neck”. If a set of institutions
after occasional and insignificant historical events (Arthur,
1989) turned out to be comparatively ineffective (in the
categories of market process efficacy), than the system
is going to reproduce those ineffective stances until a
new deinstitutionalization appears, which can also be
related to the “bottle neck effect”.
An evident example of selection of ineffective market
institutions comes from the majority of Latin American
countries, which history of the 20th century shows what
may happen as a result of “unfavorable selection” of
institutions and actions of special interest groups,
provoking social sclerosis (Olson, 1984). Much of this
Fig. 1. Bottle-neck effect
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question that was latter named contemporary mercantilism
was elaborated in works of H. De Soto (1989, 2000).
Informational asymmetry created by a government,
special interest groups or any other “destabilizing factor”,
leads to unfavorable shifts in selection vectors. That is
why while conducting any reforms it is indispensible to
take into account the neutral nature of markets. Within the
asymmetry of distribution of information and incentives a
market will multiplicatively reproduce ineffective situations
(i.e. introduction of market mechanism within conformably
ineffective institutional restrictions leads to conserving of
ineffective exchanges when there is enforcement generated
by special interest groups; or when the enforcement is
absent — to folding of exchanges and closure of markets),
which can be overcome by the process of social evolution
and learning (not education) of actors, which are eventually
the representatives of the population all reforms are
conceived for.
According to Olson, the best thing a society can do
to increase its welfare is to obtain more knowledge. When
we are wrong we bring much hazard. When we are right
and bring forward coherence necessary to withstand
special interests and charlatans, we make an important
endowment into eradication of poverty and progress of
humanity (Olson, 1984).
Conclusion
In this paper we tried to concisely pin down several
questions concerning the effectiveness of market
performance and evolutionary selection of suboptimal
institutions. Neutrality of markets assumes that the
investigation of institutional transformation of economic
orders cannot be carried out without scrupulous attention
to historical context of shifts in question. Institutions are
like oil in a market’s rusty mechanism. The mechanism
will operate even if the oil is poor. But in this case it will
have more breakdowns and depreciate faster. When the
oil is good the mechanism will work just fine and serve
much longer. In this aspect the meaning of history is
revealed through taking into account not only empirical
data of any historical segment but also the sequel of events
and trajectory of economic development. History does
not supersede economic theory but serves as an
indispensible component of theoretical constructions,
especially those of institutional transformation
phenomenon.
The choice of an efficient decision dependent on
preceding path of evolution is easily proved in cases of
constant and diminishing returns. When constant return
takes place previous technological adoptions do not
influence the profitability of innovations. Within a
diminishing return, if an economic subject chooses a
technology in advance, he has to prefer the existing
version of a certified technology, which further
introduction decreases its future lucrative parameters.
That is why in this case there is a possibility to cancel
the choice, leading to a worse path of development. Within
increasing return, on the contrary, a deteriorating selection
is prevalent. If a technology is characterized by different
rates of innovations, the level of ineffectiveness decreases.
Any type of what we call “a crisis” may serve as a
deinstitutionalizing point. This is a period of time when
two important evolutionary effects take place: “bottle
neck” and “founder’s” effects. By analogy with biology,
those phenomena describe the way ineffective institutions
survive during a downfall of exchanges and distortion of
informational distribution and further evolve into stable
populations within a society. The institutions and
technologies that are being selected right now within the
current stage of an economic crisis should be treated
with great care for their populations will most probably
prevail in future. Thus, their characteristics will depict
the very quality of our further lives.
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Volchik V., Maslov A. Neutral markets, non-
neutral institutions and economic evolution
The article argues the neutral nature of markets.
It describes the ways neutral markets expand or fold
under the influence of non-neutral institutions. A
demarcation is lined up between efficacy of a market
process and a market result. The paper shows
inconsistency of existing neoclassic models in their
striving to depict equilibrium parameters. The
evolutionary nature of economies compels economists
to concentrate on efficacy of a process which might
also conduce to selection of suboptimal institutions. The
latter may become extremely robust and evolve into
stable populations if an existing institutional framework
contributes to the expansion of exchanges. These issues
are analyzed through the prism of “bottle-neck” and
“founder’s” effects. The comparative inefficiency of
economic evolution claims for effectiveness of a process
but not the general system.
Key words:  market efficacy, congenital
development, institutional transformation, bottle-neck
effect, founder’s effect.
Вольчик В., Маслов О. Нейтральні ринки, не
нейтральні інститути і економічна еволюція
Стаття аргументує нейтральну природу ринків.
Вона описує ринки нейтральної держави, які розши-
рюються або закриваються під впливом не нейтраль-
них інститутів. Демаркація визначається між ефектив-
ністю ринкового процесу і ринковим результатом. Стат-
тя показує неузгодженість існування неокласичних
моделей в їх прагненні зображати рівноважні пара-
метри. Еволюційна природа економік примушує еко-
номістів зосередитися на ефективності процесу, який,
можливо, також вів би до виділення підоптимальних
інститутів. Останнє, можливо, стає надзвичайно здо-
ровим і еволюціонує в стійких співтовариствах, якщо
встановлена структура існування сприяє розширен-
ню обмінів. Ці проблеми аналізуються через призму
критичного “ресурсу” і ефекту “засновника”. По-
рівняльна нездатність економічної еволюції вимагає
ефективності процесу, але не системи в цілому.
Ключові слова: ефективність ринку, природже-
ний розвиток, встановлене перетворення, ефект кри-
тичного ресурсу, ефект засновника.
Вольчик В., Маслов А. Нейтральные рынки, не
нейтральные институты и экономическая эволюция
Статья аргументирует нейтральную природу рын-
ков. Она описывает рынки нейтрального государства,
которые расширяются или закрываются под влиянием
не нейтральных институтов. Демаркация выстраивает-
ся между эффективностью рыночного процесса и ры-
ночным результатом. Статья показывает несогласован-
ность существования неоклассических моделей в их
стремлении изображать равновесные параметры. Эво-
люционная природа экономик заставляет экономистов
сосредоточиться на эффективности процесса, который,
возможно, также вел бы к выделению подоптималь-
ных институтов. Последнее, возможно, становится чрез-
вычайно здравым и эволюционирует в устойчивых со-
обществах, если установленная структура существо-
вания содействует расширению обменов. Эти пробле-
мы анализируются через призму критического “ресур-
са” и эффекта “основателя”. Сравнительная неспособ-
ность экономической эволюции требует эффективнос-
ти процесса, но не системы в целом.
Ключевые слова: эффективность рынка, прирож-
денное развитие, установленное преобразование, эф-
фект критического ресурса, эффект основателя.
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